Khalilzad warns for
regional wars in the Middle East
Khalilzad and Casey are keenly aware of the diminishing support in the U.S. for the war and for the President. Both referred anxiously to the debate “back home” about keeping troops in Iraq. If the U.S. left now, Khalilzad said, “obviously, we know that there would be a civil war, and a civil war could escalate in several ways. One, in which the Kurds would move to take things into their own hands rather than follow what they have agreed to in the constitution. Out of that, regional conflicts could erupt. There’s also the possibility that the sectarian war would intensify, and you could have the start of a major long-term Sunni-Shia war that could engulf the entire Middle East. You could also get an Al Qaeda rump state emerging in western Iraq, establishing a caliphate of some kind, a little Talibstan, exporting terrorism—and these scenarios are not mutually exclusive.” He added, “But staying the course should not be interpreted to mean that you’re staying the course in terms of everything that you’re doing.”
[...]
Khalilzad acknowledged that his job often involved running from problem to problem, like a fireman. What was missing, for Khalilzad and the Administration, was a focus on long-term, strategic interests. “I shudder to think what we could face if we don’t fix Iraq,” he said. “Whatever brought us here, it’s engaged us in a way that means it’s now about the world.
It's crucial and obvious for all but a bunch of American liberals that catastrophy must be avoided in Iraq. (On the other hand, Murtha is obviously not one of these liberals, and trying to give that picture, as many seems to do, only further deepens the problem of getting a serious and true debate in the U.S.)
A problem has been the obvious disconnect between U.S. policies and the realities on the ground, which actually now finally makes signs of waining with Khalilzad seemingly getting messages through to the White House, and the White House obviously beeing shaken by bad opinion poll figures and the prospect of problems in the upcomming 2006 election.
OK, it will probably turn out that the U.S. government discovers that sufficient troups can't be deployed in Iraq, so the search for other means to acheive the goals must start. Or maybe the goals must be scaled down first.
A common bet is that there will be a return to diplomacy accompanied by the involvement of less expensive troops than American volunteers and American contractors. Another kind of mercenaries, yeah, that's true.
That will be no free lunch, but the stakes are high and the price tag must be compared to the cost of longtime deployment of American troops in Iraq. Improved relations with Iran, Syria and Turkey seem unavoidable.
The Europeans are rather irrelevant in this picture. Only the Russians and possibly the French have manpower to offer. And the very same governments maybe have useful diplomatic help to offer. But the key must be rapprochement with Syria and Iran.
We don't know if the nuclear threat from Iran is as serious as the WMD threat from Iraq was, but maybe that threat could be better handled if the U.S. or some trusted partner delivered important stuff and ensured continued presence at the sites?
More as a background, Anderson also writes:
When Khalilzad was offered the Ambassador’s job [in Iraq], he called Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national-security adviser, who was Khalilzad’s mentor when they were both on the faculty at Columbia, in the early eighties. “I told him he should be in charge of policy and not just the execution of policy,” Brzezinski said recently. “He brings a lot more to bear than his predecessors, who knew nothing about Iraq. I wonder how many of our top decision-makers knew, a few years ago, the difference between a Sunni and a Shia. It was a gutsy decision to put himself in the line of fire. He is a broad-minded pragmatist and an insightful strategist. He has a unique advantage in a part of the world in which the United States has become massively engaged and does not have many people at the top equipped to deal with it. The top decision-makers today are ignorant and Manichaean.”
[...]
Adel Abdul Mahdi, the Shiite Vice-President of Iraq, told me, “Bremer was an administrator, Negroponte was a diplomat, and Zalmay, well, he’s an Oriental.”
I asked Mahdi what he meant.
“Zalmay presents himself as from the region,” he explained. “He behaves in a more friendly way. He understands the culture here and knows he can invite himself to come and see us. He’ll drop in and say, ‘Can we have a moment together?,’ knowing that other people will come by, as is our custom, and that he will be there, and he will discuss things with them, be part of our discussions.”
[...]
Khalilzad’s scaled-down brief is to secure enough stability and political progress in Iraq to allow for an American withdrawal. The question is whether the situation has reached an irretrievable point even for the best of diplomats—whether Khalilzad might be the right man at the wrong time. There is an inescapable irony to Khalilzad’s return to Baghdad. Not only is he expected to salvage a situation worsened by political misjudgments made by the same officials who removed him from the scene in 2003 but he is also, in a way that almost no other hawk is, dealing with the consequences of a war he helped start.
“Khalilzad was absolutely part of the neocon cabal that brought the war to Iraq,” Peter W. Galbraith, a former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, who has written extensively on Iraq and the Kurds, said. Still, he added, “I credit him with bringing the first dose of realism I’ve seen in this Administration since they came to Iraq.”
[...]
[U]nder Khalilzad the rhetoric about a U.S. commitment to a single, unified nation of Iraq had diminished. “He understood quickly that this constitution was more of a peace treaty than a nation-building exercise, and that what he had to produce was a road map to avoid a future civil war.
“Khalilzad is clearly a policymaker on this,” Galbraith said. “There’s a common misunderstanding that American Ambassadors go and have tea and carry messages that have been formulated in Washington. But, really, the Ambassador is in charge of policy in that country. You have the expertise, the knowledge, and know the people, and ultimately it’s your position that gets carried. You have an advantage over the people in Washington. Khalilzad understood this in Afghanistan and he understands it in Iraq. And he’s in the business of shaping his own instructions. So when he’s going out and talking with Sunni sheikhs, or delaying the constitution to allow compromises to be made, that’s him doing it, not Washington.”
Never-the-less, the final decissions are of course made in Washington. Where the next election never is many years ahead.
